Emergence of norms for social efficiency in partially iterative non-coordinated games

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Abstract

We discuss the emergence of social norms for efficiently resolving conflict situations through reinforcement learning and investigate the features of the emergent norms, where conflict situations can be expressed by non-cooperative payoff matrix and will remain if they fail to resolve the conflicts.

Original languageEnglish
Pages1125-1126
Number of pages2
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Jan 1
Event10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011 - Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China
Duration: 2011 May 22011 May 6

Conference

Conference10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011
CountryTaiwan, Province of China
CityTaipei
Period11/5/211/5/6

Keywords

  • Conflict
  • Coordination
  • Norm
  • Reinforcement Learning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence

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  • Cite this

    Sugawara, T. (2011). Emergence of norms for social efficiency in partially iterative non-coordinated games. 1125-1126. Paper presented at 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011, Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China.