Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: Price competition with managerial Delegation

Yasuhiko Nakamura*, Tomohiro Inoue

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

23 Citations (Scopus)


We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the mixed duopoly model and examine its influence on price setting in a mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous-timing problem. We obtain the result that owners of a public and a private firm prefer to delay the setting of the prices of their products as much as possible. Thus, in equilibrium, the firms choose their prices simultaneously in the latter stage of the game. This is in contrast to the findings of the entrepreneurial case, according to which firms choose prices simultaneously in the former stage. copyright

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)325-333
Number of pages9
JournalManagerial and Decision Economics
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Jul

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research


Dive into the research topics of 'Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: Price competition with managerial Delegation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this