Abstract
The introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities sequentially in the equilibrium of our model. Thus, we find that the Pal's (1998) results are robust against managerial delegation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Economics Bulletin |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 27 |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 Oct 19 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: The managerial delegation case'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
Cite this
Nakamura, Y., & Inoue, T. (2007). Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: The managerial delegation case. Economics Bulletin, 12(27).