Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: The managerial delegation case

Yasuhiko Nakamura; Tomohiro Inoue

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: The managerial delegation case

Yasuhiko Nakamura, Tomohiro Inoue

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities sequentially in the equilibrium of our model. Thus, we find that the Pal's (1998) results are robust against managerial delegation.

Original language	English
Journal	Economics Bulletin
Volume	12
Issue number	27
Publication status	Published - 2007 Oct 19

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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abstract = "The introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities sequentially in the equilibrium of our model. Thus, we find that the Pal's (1998) results are robust against managerial delegation.",

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