Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: The managerial delegation case

Yasuhiko Nakamura*, Tomohiro Inoue

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities sequentially in the equilibrium of our model. Thus, we find that the Pal's (1998) results are robust against managerial delegation.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume12
Issue number27
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Oct 19

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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