Abstract
This paper is written as an introduction to epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications. It starts with both semantics and syntax of classical logic, and goes to the Hilbert-style proof-theory and Kripke-style model theory of epistemic logics. In these theories, we discuss individual decision making in some simple game examples. In particular, we will discuss the distinction between beliefs and knowledge, and how false beliefs play roles in game theoretic decision making. Finally, we discuss extensions of epistemic logics to incorporate I common knowledge. In the extension, we discuss also false beliefs on common knowledge.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 7-62 |
Number of pages | 56 |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Volume | 19 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2002 Jan |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Beliefs
- Classical logic
- Common knowledge logic
- Decision criterion
- Dominant strategy
- Epistemic depth of a formula
- Epistemic logic
- Knowledge
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics