Epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications: Introduction

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper is written as an introduction to epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications. It starts with both semantics and syntax of classical logic, and goes to the Hilbert-style proof-theory and Kripke-style model theory of epistemic logics. In these theories, we discuss individual decision making in some simple game examples. In particular, we will discuss the distinction between beliefs and knowledge, and how false beliefs play roles in game theoretic decision making. Finally, we discuss extensions of epistemic logics to incorporate I common knowledge. In the extension, we discuss also false beliefs on common knowledge.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)7-62
Number of pages56
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume19
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2002 Jan
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Epistemic logic
Common knowledge
Individual decision making
Logic
Decision making
Simple game

Keywords

  • Beliefs
  • Classical logic
  • Common knowledge logic
  • Decision criterion
  • Dominant strategy
  • Epistemic depth of a formula
  • Epistemic logic
  • Knowledge

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications : Introduction. / Kaneko, Mamoru.

In: Economic Theory, Vol. 19, No. 1, 01.2002, p. 7-62.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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