Equilibrium Seeking in Two-Agent Non-Cooperative Dynamic Game with Asymmetric Horizon Length

Taichi Tanaka, Yasuaki Wasa, Tomohisa Hayakawa

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

This paper investigates equilibrium and stability analysis in a two-agent non-cooperative dynamic game. Almost all existing papers handling finite-horizon dynamic games assume the common prediction horizon length, whereas this paper considers an asymmetric length case due to differences in personal values. We thus propose two possible control strategies without the knowledge of the other agent's horizon information through a linear-quadratic game. One of the proposed control strategies is the receding horizon control based on an open-loop Nash equilibrium with the common horizon case. The other is an iterative optimization-based control with each agent estimating the other's feedback gain from the state information. We also discuss the effectiveness of the proposed strategies and the stability condition of the corresponding closed-loop systems through numerical examples.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationASCC 2022 - 2022 13th Asian Control Conference, Proceedings
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2286-2291
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9788993215236
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022
Event13th Asian Control Conference, ASCC 2022 - Jeju, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 2022 May 42022 May 7

Publication series

NameASCC 2022 - 2022 13th Asian Control Conference, Proceedings

Conference

Conference13th Asian Control Conference, ASCC 2022
Country/TerritoryKorea, Republic of
CityJeju
Period22/5/422/5/7

Keywords

  • asymmetric horizon length
  • dynamic game
  • equilibrium seeking
  • iterative optimization
  • Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Control and Optimization

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