Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains

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    7 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible good among a group of agents in which each agent demands at most one unit of the good and money payment or receipt is required. Under general preference domains that may contain non quasi-linear preferences, the Vickrey allocation rule is characterized by axioms for equity and continuity without use of efficiency: namely, the Vickrey rule is the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, weak envy-freeness for equals, non-imposition, and continuity of welfare.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)813-830
    Number of pages18
    JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
    Volume42
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jul 7

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
    • Economics and Econometrics

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