Game research on process conflicts under the bounded rationality of science and technology innovation team members

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Due to the difference of individuals in the team of science and technology innovation, team members are prone to team process conflict due to the differences in tasks and team goals. Based on the moderating effect of process conflict on team collaboration, this paper constructs a process conflict evolutionary game model that focuses on the self-interest of members of S&T team and analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategy (keeping proper process conflict). The results show that when the net income of team members choosing conflict is greater than the excess return of choosing cooperation, the team members will gradually produce destructive conflict (non-cooperation) in the process of long-term evolutionary learning; the net income of team members choosing conflict is less than the choice during the long-term evolutionary learning process of members, due to the limited rationality of the team members, they can not achieve full cooperation with each other through the learning ability of the members of the game. However, by influencing the team members in the outcome of the evolutionary game, strategic choice of the key parameters of the adjustment, you can gradually generate constructive conflicts, so that the team members to maintain the purpose of cooperation with each other.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2629-2637
Number of pages9
JournalXitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice
Volume38
Issue number10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Oct 1

Fingerprint

Bounded Rationality
science and technology
innovation
Innovation
Game
learning
Evolutionary Learning
Evolutionary Game
income
Conflict
conflict
Rationality
Learning Process
Excess
Adjustment

Keywords

  • Bounded rationality
  • Evolutionary game
  • Process conflict
  • Stable strategy
  • Team members

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Economic Geology
  • Computer Science Applications

Cite this

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abstract = "Due to the difference of individuals in the team of science and technology innovation, team members are prone to team process conflict due to the differences in tasks and team goals. Based on the moderating effect of process conflict on team collaboration, this paper constructs a process conflict evolutionary game model that focuses on the self-interest of members of S&T team and analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategy (keeping proper process conflict). The results show that when the net income of team members choosing conflict is greater than the excess return of choosing cooperation, the team members will gradually produce destructive conflict (non-cooperation) in the process of long-term evolutionary learning; the net income of team members choosing conflict is less than the choice during the long-term evolutionary learning process of members, due to the limited rationality of the team members, they can not achieve full cooperation with each other through the learning ability of the members of the game. However, by influencing the team members in the outcome of the evolutionary game, strategic choice of the key parameters of the adjustment, you can gradually generate constructive conflicts, so that the team members to maintain the purpose of cooperation with each other.",
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AB - Due to the difference of individuals in the team of science and technology innovation, team members are prone to team process conflict due to the differences in tasks and team goals. Based on the moderating effect of process conflict on team collaboration, this paper constructs a process conflict evolutionary game model that focuses on the self-interest of members of S&T team and analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategy (keeping proper process conflict). The results show that when the net income of team members choosing conflict is greater than the excess return of choosing cooperation, the team members will gradually produce destructive conflict (non-cooperation) in the process of long-term evolutionary learning; the net income of team members choosing conflict is less than the choice during the long-term evolutionary learning process of members, due to the limited rationality of the team members, they can not achieve full cooperation with each other through the learning ability of the members of the game. However, by influencing the team members in the outcome of the evolutionary game, strategic choice of the key parameters of the adjustment, you can gradually generate constructive conflicts, so that the team members to maintain the purpose of cooperation with each other.

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