Game theory based hybrid access for macrocell-edge users in a macro-femto network

Yanwei Li, Zhenyu Zhou, Nam Nguyen, Takuro Sato

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The extensive deployment of femtocells introduces co-channel interference to the macro cell-edge users (MCEUs), which degrades the throughput improvement of the total network. In this paper, we consider the scenario in which the femtocell base station (FBS) allows the hybrid access of MCEUs on the condition that the MCEUs rent the power resource from it. However, the FBS is power limited. If almost all of its power is used to serve the MCEUs and its original femtocell users (FUEs), when newly authoritized FUEs are switched on, there will be little power left to serve these newly authoritized FUEs. In this situation, the FBS can select one MCEU as a relay to coordinate its information transmission to the FUE. To reward the cooperation of the MCEUs, the FBS will agree to support the service of MCEUs without charging. Stackelberg game is used to find the optimal power and price value for this procedure. An MCEU relay selection criterion is proposed for the FBS. The optimal power that the MCEU can obtain from the FBS and the power that the MCEU can obtain from the FBS and the power that the MCEU can share with the FUEs are obtained. The simulation results show that the throughputs of both the FUEs and the MCEUs are improved.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationIEEE Vehicular Technology Conference
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2013
    Event2013 IEEE 77th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC Spring 2013 - Dresden
    Duration: 2013 Jun 22013 Jun 5

    Other

    Other2013 IEEE 77th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC Spring 2013
    CityDresden
    Period13/6/213/6/5

    Fingerprint

    Femtocell
    Game theory
    Game Theory
    Macros
    Base stations
    Cell
    Throughput
    Stackelberg Game
    Co-channel Interference
    Relay Selection

    Keywords

    • Femtocell
    • Macro cell-edge users
    • Power allocation
    • Stackelberg game

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
    • Computer Science Applications
    • Applied Mathematics

    Cite this

    Game theory based hybrid access for macrocell-edge users in a macro-femto network. / Li, Yanwei; Zhou, Zhenyu; Nguyen, Nam; Sato, Takuro.

    IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference. 2013. 6692575.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Li, Y, Zhou, Z, Nguyen, N & Sato, T 2013, Game theory based hybrid access for macrocell-edge users in a macro-femto network. in IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference., 6692575, 2013 IEEE 77th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC Spring 2013, Dresden, 13/6/2. https://doi.org/10.1109/VTCSpring.2013.6692575
    Li, Yanwei ; Zhou, Zhenyu ; Nguyen, Nam ; Sato, Takuro. / Game theory based hybrid access for macrocell-edge users in a macro-femto network. IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference. 2013.
    @inproceedings{07f53995dc984c5ea792197353aff979,
    title = "Game theory based hybrid access for macrocell-edge users in a macro-femto network",
    abstract = "The extensive deployment of femtocells introduces co-channel interference to the macro cell-edge users (MCEUs), which degrades the throughput improvement of the total network. In this paper, we consider the scenario in which the femtocell base station (FBS) allows the hybrid access of MCEUs on the condition that the MCEUs rent the power resource from it. However, the FBS is power limited. If almost all of its power is used to serve the MCEUs and its original femtocell users (FUEs), when newly authoritized FUEs are switched on, there will be little power left to serve these newly authoritized FUEs. In this situation, the FBS can select one MCEU as a relay to coordinate its information transmission to the FUE. To reward the cooperation of the MCEUs, the FBS will agree to support the service of MCEUs without charging. Stackelberg game is used to find the optimal power and price value for this procedure. An MCEU relay selection criterion is proposed for the FBS. The optimal power that the MCEU can obtain from the FBS and the power that the MCEU can obtain from the FBS and the power that the MCEU can share with the FUEs are obtained. The simulation results show that the throughputs of both the FUEs and the MCEUs are improved.",
    keywords = "Femtocell, Macro cell-edge users, Power allocation, Stackelberg game",
    author = "Yanwei Li and Zhenyu Zhou and Nam Nguyen and Takuro Sato",
    year = "2013",
    doi = "10.1109/VTCSpring.2013.6692575",
    language = "English",
    isbn = "9781467363372",
    booktitle = "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",

    }

    TY - GEN

    T1 - Game theory based hybrid access for macrocell-edge users in a macro-femto network

    AU - Li, Yanwei

    AU - Zhou, Zhenyu

    AU - Nguyen, Nam

    AU - Sato, Takuro

    PY - 2013

    Y1 - 2013

    N2 - The extensive deployment of femtocells introduces co-channel interference to the macro cell-edge users (MCEUs), which degrades the throughput improvement of the total network. In this paper, we consider the scenario in which the femtocell base station (FBS) allows the hybrid access of MCEUs on the condition that the MCEUs rent the power resource from it. However, the FBS is power limited. If almost all of its power is used to serve the MCEUs and its original femtocell users (FUEs), when newly authoritized FUEs are switched on, there will be little power left to serve these newly authoritized FUEs. In this situation, the FBS can select one MCEU as a relay to coordinate its information transmission to the FUE. To reward the cooperation of the MCEUs, the FBS will agree to support the service of MCEUs without charging. Stackelberg game is used to find the optimal power and price value for this procedure. An MCEU relay selection criterion is proposed for the FBS. The optimal power that the MCEU can obtain from the FBS and the power that the MCEU can obtain from the FBS and the power that the MCEU can share with the FUEs are obtained. The simulation results show that the throughputs of both the FUEs and the MCEUs are improved.

    AB - The extensive deployment of femtocells introduces co-channel interference to the macro cell-edge users (MCEUs), which degrades the throughput improvement of the total network. In this paper, we consider the scenario in which the femtocell base station (FBS) allows the hybrid access of MCEUs on the condition that the MCEUs rent the power resource from it. However, the FBS is power limited. If almost all of its power is used to serve the MCEUs and its original femtocell users (FUEs), when newly authoritized FUEs are switched on, there will be little power left to serve these newly authoritized FUEs. In this situation, the FBS can select one MCEU as a relay to coordinate its information transmission to the FUE. To reward the cooperation of the MCEUs, the FBS will agree to support the service of MCEUs without charging. Stackelberg game is used to find the optimal power and price value for this procedure. An MCEU relay selection criterion is proposed for the FBS. The optimal power that the MCEU can obtain from the FBS and the power that the MCEU can obtain from the FBS and the power that the MCEU can share with the FUEs are obtained. The simulation results show that the throughputs of both the FUEs and the MCEUs are improved.

    KW - Femtocell

    KW - Macro cell-edge users

    KW - Power allocation

    KW - Stackelberg game

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84893605708&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84893605708&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1109/VTCSpring.2013.6692575

    DO - 10.1109/VTCSpring.2013.6692575

    M3 - Conference contribution

    SN - 9781467363372

    BT - IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference

    ER -