Gibbardian libertarian claims revisited

K. Suzumura, Koichi Suga

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Two resolution schemes for the impossibility theorems on the Gibbard-Kelly claims of libertarian rights, which are rather contrasting with each other, are proposed and their implications discussed. The first scheme asserts that there exists a collective choice rule satisfying the Pareto principle and the Gibbard-Kelly libertarian claims if there exists at least one socially unconcerned individual. The second scheme asserts existence of an eligible collective choice rule if there exists at least one liberal individual.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)61-73
Number of pages13
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume3
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1986 Jun
Externally publishedYes

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Collective choice
Impossibility theorem
Pareto principle

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Gibbardian libertarian claims revisited. / Suzumura, K.; Suga, Koichi.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 3, No. 1, 06.1986, p. 61-73.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Suzumura, K. ; Suga, Koichi. / Gibbardian libertarian claims revisited. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 1986 ; Vol. 3, No. 1. pp. 61-73.
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