Global economic institutions and the autonomy of development policy: A pluralist approach

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Introduction: Specialized institutions with narrowly defined mandates flourish in various fields of international law. Global economic institutions (GEIs) such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been among the most influential. The main source of their influence is that the GEIs are often equipped with effective tools to enforce rules and policies. For example, the World Bank and the IMF may impose conditions on their loans while the WTO has a compulsory dispute settlement system. The enforcement of their rules and policies not only affects inter-state relations among the member countries but also, and more often, forces the modification of the members’ domestic policies. Because of the growing impact of the latter, these institutions are occasionally criticized for unduly restricting the autonomy of the member countries’ decision-making processes, Interestingly enough, the critics do not necessarily argue that the GEIs should not influence the domestic policies of the members at all; rather, the criticism concerns how they should do so. The criticism is twofold. First, critics express a concern over the ‘democratic deficit’ of the institutions in view of the lack of procedures in place to reflect the voices of all stakeholders, including state and non-state actors. They argue that no institution should enforce rules and policies that are formulated in the absence of those potentially affected by these rules and policies.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternational Economic Law and National Autonomy
PublisherCambridge University Press
Pages22-43
Number of pages22
Volume9780521114608
ISBN (Print)9780511760471, 9780521114608
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010 Jan 1

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development policy
autonomy
economics
domestic policy
IMF
World Bank
WTO
critic
criticism
international law
loan
decision-making process
deficit
stakeholder
lack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Fukunaga, Y. (2010). Global economic institutions and the autonomy of development policy: A pluralist approach. In International Economic Law and National Autonomy (Vol. 9780521114608, pp. 22-43). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511760471.003

Global economic institutions and the autonomy of development policy : A pluralist approach. / Fukunaga, Yuka.

International Economic Law and National Autonomy. Vol. 9780521114608 Cambridge University Press, 2010. p. 22-43.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Fukunaga, Y 2010, Global economic institutions and the autonomy of development policy: A pluralist approach. in International Economic Law and National Autonomy. vol. 9780521114608, Cambridge University Press, pp. 22-43. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511760471.003
Fukunaga Y. Global economic institutions and the autonomy of development policy: A pluralist approach. In International Economic Law and National Autonomy. Vol. 9780521114608. Cambridge University Press. 2010. p. 22-43 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511760471.003
Fukunaga, Yuka. / Global economic institutions and the autonomy of development policy : A pluralist approach. International Economic Law and National Autonomy. Vol. 9780521114608 Cambridge University Press, 2010. pp. 22-43
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