How does collective intelligence emerge in the standard minority game?

Satoshi Kurihara, Kensuke Fukuda, Toshio Hirotsu, Osamu Akashi, Shinya Sato, Toshiharu Sugawara

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper we analyze a simple adaptive model of competition called the Minority Game, which is used in analyzing competitive phenomena such as the operation of the market economy. The Minority Game is played by many simple autonomous agents, which develop collective self-organization as a result of simple behavioral rules. Many algorithms that produce the desired behavior in the game have been proposed. In all work to date, however, the focus has been on the macroscopic behavior of the agents as a whole. We focus on the behavior of individual agents, paying particular attention to the original form of the Minority Game. We suggest that the core elements responsible for the development of self-organization are (i) rules that place a good constraint on the behaviors of individual agents and (ii) the existence of rules that lead to effective indirect coordination. We also show that when efficient organization is formed, a power-law can be seen among behavior of individual agents.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Pages279-289
Number of pages11
Volume567
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Volume567
ISSN (Print)00758442

Fingerprint

Collective Intelligence
Minority Game
Self-organization
Autonomous Agents
Power Law
Standards
Minorities
Collective intelligence
Game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Kurihara, S., Fukuda, K., Hirotsu, T., Akashi, O., Sato, S., & Sugawara, T. (2006). How does collective intelligence emerge in the standard minority game? In Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (Vol. 567, pp. 279-289). (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems; Vol. 567). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28727-2_19

How does collective intelligence emerge in the standard minority game? / Kurihara, Satoshi; Fukuda, Kensuke; Hirotsu, Toshio; Akashi, Osamu; Sato, Shinya; Sugawara, Toshiharu.

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Vol. 567 2006. p. 279-289 (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems; Vol. 567).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Kurihara, S, Fukuda, K, Hirotsu, T, Akashi, O, Sato, S & Sugawara, T 2006, How does collective intelligence emerge in the standard minority game? in Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. vol. 567, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol. 567, pp. 279-289. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28727-2_19
Kurihara S, Fukuda K, Hirotsu T, Akashi O, Sato S, Sugawara T. How does collective intelligence emerge in the standard minority game? In Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Vol. 567. 2006. p. 279-289. (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28727-2_19
Kurihara, Satoshi ; Fukuda, Kensuke ; Hirotsu, Toshio ; Akashi, Osamu ; Sato, Shinya ; Sugawara, Toshiharu. / How does collective intelligence emerge in the standard minority game?. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Vol. 567 2006. pp. 279-289 (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems).
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