TY - JOUR
T1 - How mutation alters the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on networks
AU - Ichinose, Genki
AU - Satotani, Yoshiki
AU - Sayama, Hiroki
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2017, The Authors. All rights reserved.
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2017/11/2
Y1 - 2017/11/2
N2 - Cooperation is ubiquitous at every level of living organisms. It is known that spatial (network) structure is a viable mechanism for cooperation to evolve. A recently proposed numerical metric, Average Gradient of Selection (AGoS), a useful tool for interpreting and visualizing evolutionary dynamics on networks, allows simulation results to be visualized on a one-dimensional phase space. However, stochastic mutation of strategies was not considered in the analysis of AGoS. Here we extend AGoS so that it can analyze the evolution of cooperation where mutation may alter strategies of individuals on networks. We show that our extended AGoS correctly visualizes the final states of cooperation with mutation in the individual-based simulations. Our analyses revealed that mutation always has a negative effect on the evolution of cooperation regardless of the payoff functions, fraction of cooperators, and network structures. Moreover, we found that scale-free networks are the most vulnerable to mutation and thus the dynamics of cooperation are altered from bistability to coexistence on those networks, undergoing an imperfect pitchfork bifurcation.MSC Codes 91A22
AB - Cooperation is ubiquitous at every level of living organisms. It is known that spatial (network) structure is a viable mechanism for cooperation to evolve. A recently proposed numerical metric, Average Gradient of Selection (AGoS), a useful tool for interpreting and visualizing evolutionary dynamics on networks, allows simulation results to be visualized on a one-dimensional phase space. However, stochastic mutation of strategies was not considered in the analysis of AGoS. Here we extend AGoS so that it can analyze the evolution of cooperation where mutation may alter strategies of individuals on networks. We show that our extended AGoS correctly visualizes the final states of cooperation with mutation in the individual-based simulations. Our analyses revealed that mutation always has a negative effect on the evolution of cooperation regardless of the payoff functions, fraction of cooperators, and network structures. Moreover, we found that scale-free networks are the most vulnerable to mutation and thus the dynamics of cooperation are altered from bistability to coexistence on those networks, undergoing an imperfect pitchfork bifurcation.MSC Codes 91A22
KW - Average gradient of selection
KW - Bifurcation
KW - Equilibrium point
KW - Evolution of cooperation
KW - Network structure
KW - Prisoner’s dilemma game
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M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85094282050
JO - Nuclear Physics A
JF - Nuclear Physics A
SN - 0375-9474
ER -