Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values

René van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    7 Citations (Scopus)


    In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, 2001) who implemented the Shapley value for cooperative transferable utility games. This modification of the mechanism yields the corresponding discounted Shapley value as the payoff distribution in every subgame perfect equilibrium. The class of discounted Shapley values contains the Shapley value and equal division solution as its extreme cases. Interestingly, we obtain axiomatizations of each solution in this class by generalizing the null player property (of the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (of the equal division solution) to the so-called δ-reducing player property.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)329-344
    Number of pages16
    JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - 2015 Sep 24


    • 91A10
    • 91A12

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

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