Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures

Yoshio Kamijo*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


This paper studies a non-cooperative mechanism implementing a cooperative solution for a situation in which members of a society are subdivided into groups and/or coalitions and there is asymmetry among the individuals of the society. To describe hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structure simultaneously, we present unified classes of games, the games with social structure, and define a weighted value for these games. We show that our mechanism works in any zero-monotonic environment and implements the Shapley value, the weighted Shapley value, the Owen's coalitional value, and the weighted coalitional value, in some special cases.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)336-349
Number of pages14
JournalMathematical social sciences
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Nov


  • Coalitional value
  • Implementation
  • Shapley value
  • Social structure
  • Weighted value

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


Dive into the research topics of 'Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this