Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment

Haris Aziz, Yoichi Kasajima

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the problem of assigning objects probabilistically among a group of agents who may have multi-unit demands. Each agent has linear preferences over the (set of) objects. The most commonly used extension of preferences to compare probabilistic assignments is by means of stochastic dominance, which leads to corresponding notions of envy-freeness, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. We show that equal treatment of equals, efficiency, and strategy-proofness are incompatible. Moreover, anonymity, neutrality, efficiency, and weak strategy-proofness are incompatible. If we strengthen weak strategy-proofness to weak group strategy-proofness, then when agents have single-unit demands, anonymity, neutrality, efficiency, and weak group strategy-proofness become incompatible.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)255-275
Number of pages21
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume49
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Aug 1

Fingerprint

efficiency
anonymity
neutrality
envy
equal treatment
Group
Strategy-proofness
Assignment
Impossibility
Anonymity
Neutrality
Equal treatment
Envy-freeness
Stochastic dominance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment. / Aziz, Haris; Kasajima, Yoichi.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 49, No. 2, 01.08.2017, p. 255-275.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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