Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference

Takehiro Inohara, Shingo Takahashi, Bunpei Nakano

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we treat strategic information exchange among subjects in a conflict that involves incompleteness of information in terms of subjects' preference and their interdependence. Then, we give two theorems that indicate senselessness of deceit. One of the theorems implies that any attempt of a subject to change another subject's preference by deceit will end in failure. The other theorem implies that deceit of a subject causes changes of preference of the subject, thus strategic information exchange cannot be effective.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)221-244
Number of pages24
JournalApplied Mathematics and Computation
Volume81
Issue number2-3
Publication statusPublished - 1997
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Deception
Theorem
Imply
Incompleteness
Conflict

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Applied Mathematics
  • Computational Mathematics
  • Numerical Analysis

Cite this

Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference. / Inohara, Takehiro; Takahashi, Shingo; Nakano, Bunpei.

In: Applied Mathematics and Computation, Vol. 81, No. 2-3, 1997, p. 221-244.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{8b49ed2e7d88421f807f7fa79af3155a,
title = "Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference",
abstract = "In this paper, we treat strategic information exchange among subjects in a conflict that involves incompleteness of information in terms of subjects' preference and their interdependence. Then, we give two theorems that indicate senselessness of deceit. One of the theorems implies that any attempt of a subject to change another subject's preference by deceit will end in failure. The other theorem implies that deceit of a subject causes changes of preference of the subject, thus strategic information exchange cannot be effective.",
author = "Takehiro Inohara and Shingo Takahashi and Bunpei Nakano",
year = "1997",
language = "English",
volume = "81",
pages = "221--244",
journal = "Applied Mathematics and Computation",
issn = "0096-3003",
publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",
number = "2-3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference

AU - Inohara, Takehiro

AU - Takahashi, Shingo

AU - Nakano, Bunpei

PY - 1997

Y1 - 1997

N2 - In this paper, we treat strategic information exchange among subjects in a conflict that involves incompleteness of information in terms of subjects' preference and their interdependence. Then, we give two theorems that indicate senselessness of deceit. One of the theorems implies that any attempt of a subject to change another subject's preference by deceit will end in failure. The other theorem implies that deceit of a subject causes changes of preference of the subject, thus strategic information exchange cannot be effective.

AB - In this paper, we treat strategic information exchange among subjects in a conflict that involves incompleteness of information in terms of subjects' preference and their interdependence. Then, we give two theorems that indicate senselessness of deceit. One of the theorems implies that any attempt of a subject to change another subject's preference by deceit will end in failure. The other theorem implies that deceit of a subject causes changes of preference of the subject, thus strategic information exchange cannot be effective.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0040128814&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0040128814&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0040128814

VL - 81

SP - 221

EP - 244

JO - Applied Mathematics and Computation

JF - Applied Mathematics and Computation

SN - 0096-3003

IS - 2-3

ER -