TY - JOUR
T1 - Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference
AU - Inohara, Takehiro
AU - Takahashi, Shingo
AU - Nakano, Bunpei
PY - 1997/1/1
Y1 - 1997/1/1
N2 - In this paper, we treat strategic information exchange among subjects in a conflict that involves incompleteness of information in terms of subjects' preference and their interdependence. Then, we give two theorems that indicate senselessness of deceit. One of the theorems implies that any attempt of a subject to change another subject's preference by deceit will end in failure. The other theorem implies that deceit of a subject causes changes of preference of the subject, thus strategic information exchange cannot be effective.
AB - In this paper, we treat strategic information exchange among subjects in a conflict that involves incompleteness of information in terms of subjects' preference and their interdependence. Then, we give two theorems that indicate senselessness of deceit. One of the theorems implies that any attempt of a subject to change another subject's preference by deceit will end in failure. The other theorem implies that deceit of a subject causes changes of preference of the subject, thus strategic information exchange cannot be effective.
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U2 - 10.1016/S0096-3003(96)00018-5
DO - 10.1016/S0096-3003(96)00018-5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0040128814
SN - 0096-3003
VL - 81
SP - 221
EP - 244
JO - Applied Mathematics and Computation
JF - Applied Mathematics and Computation
IS - 2-3
ER -