Impossibility theorems with interpersonally comparable welfare levels

The "extended sympathy approach" reconsidered

Ryo Ichi Nagahisa, Koichi Suga

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We re-examine a type of interpersonal welfare comparison, called the "extended sympathy" approach, which Arrow (1977), Hammond (1976) and Roberts (1980a) introduced in order to escape from Arrovian impossibility theorems. In particular, we extend the positional dictatorship theorem due to Roberts to the case where the domain of social choice rules satisfies the axiom of identity. We show that there is a positional dictator if the rule with the domain satisfies independence, Suppes unanimity and monotonicity.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)171-190
Number of pages20
JournalJapanese Economic Review
Volume49
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1998
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Impossibility theorem
Sympathy
Social choice rule
Dictatorship
Axiom
Monotonicity
Dictator
Unanimity
Welfare comparisons

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Impossibility theorems with interpersonally comparable welfare levels : The "extended sympathy approach" reconsidered. / Nagahisa, Ryo Ichi; Suga, Koichi.

In: Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1998, p. 171-190.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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