Inductive game theory: Discrimination and prejudices

Mamoru Kaneko*, Akihiko Matsui

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)


This paper proposes a new theory, which we call inductive game theory. In this theory, the individual player does not have a priori knowledge of the structure of the game that he plays repeatedly. Instead, he accumulates experiences induced by occasional random trials in the repeated play. A stationary state is required to be stable against intentional deviations based on the player's experiences, and then it turns out to be a Nash equilibrium. The main part of the paper is the consideration of possible individual views of the society based on individual experiences. This view is defined to be a model of the society which the player builds from his experiences. Coherency with these experiences and a condition called rationalization are required for a model. As concrete objects of the theory, this paper analyzes the phenomena of discrimination and prejudice. The development of the new theory is undertaken by contrasting its observational and behavioral aspects with mental and judgmental aspects. The relationship between discrimination and prejudice will emerge in this dichotomous consideration.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)101-137
Number of pages37
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1999
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance
  • Sociology and Political Science


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