INFLATION STABILIZATION and DEFAULT RISK in A CURRENCY UNION

Eiji Okano*, Masashige Hamano

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

By developing a class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities and assuming a two-country currency union with sovereign risk, we show that there is not necessarily a trade-off between the prevention of default risk and stabilizing inflation. Under optimal monetary and fiscal policy, comprising a de facto inflation stabilization policy, the tax rate as an optimal fiscal policy tool plays an important role in stabilizing inflation, although not completely because of the distorted steady state. Changes in the tax rate to minimize welfare costs via stabilizing inflation then improve the fiscal surplus, and because of this and the incompletely stabilized inflation, the default rate does not increase as much.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1790-1807
Number of pages18
JournalMacroeconomic Dynamics
Volume22
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Oct 1

Keywords

  • European Crisis
  • Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
  • Optimal Monetary Policy
  • Sovereign Risk

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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