Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: 1

Pradeep Dubey*, Mamoru Kaneko

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure strategies. But in Section 2 behavioral strategies are also examined. It turns out that they can be modeled as pure strategies of an appropriately enlarged game. Our results, applied to the enlarged game, can then be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral strategies of the original game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)111-139
Number of pages29
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1984
Externally publishedYes


  • anti-folk theorem
  • Extensive game
  • folk theorem
  • information patterns
  • Nash Equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Economics and Econometrics


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