Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games

1

Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure strategies. But in Section 2 behavioral strategies are also examined. It turns out that they can be modeled as pure strategies of an appropriately enlarged game. Our results, applied to the enlarged game, can then be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral strategies of the original game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)111-139
Number of pages29
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume8
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1984
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Nash Equilibrium
Game
Strategy
Nash equilibrium
Extensive games
Pure strategies

Keywords

  • anti-folk theorem
  • Extensive game
  • folk theorem
  • information patterns
  • Nash Equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games : 1. / Dubey, Pradeep; Kaneko, Mamoru.

In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1984, p. 111-139.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{a4cd48168b2040b8832c51e1622a31c8,
title = "Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: 1",
abstract = "In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure strategies. But in Section 2 behavioral strategies are also examined. It turns out that they can be modeled as pure strategies of an appropriately enlarged game. Our results, applied to the enlarged game, can then be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral strategies of the original game.",
keywords = "anti-folk theorem, Extensive game, folk theorem, information patterns, Nash Equilibrium",
author = "Pradeep Dubey and Mamoru Kaneko",
year = "1984",
doi = "10.1016/0165-4896(84)90011-8",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
pages = "111--139",
journal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",
issn = "0165-4896",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games

T2 - 1

AU - Dubey, Pradeep

AU - Kaneko, Mamoru

PY - 1984

Y1 - 1984

N2 - In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure strategies. But in Section 2 behavioral strategies are also examined. It turns out that they can be modeled as pure strategies of an appropriately enlarged game. Our results, applied to the enlarged game, can then be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral strategies of the original game.

AB - In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure strategies. But in Section 2 behavioral strategies are also examined. It turns out that they can be modeled as pure strategies of an appropriately enlarged game. Our results, applied to the enlarged game, can then be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral strategies of the original game.

KW - anti-folk theorem

KW - Extensive game

KW - folk theorem

KW - information patterns

KW - Nash Equilibrium

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0037947461&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0037947461&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/0165-4896(84)90011-8

DO - 10.1016/0165-4896(84)90011-8

M3 - Article

VL - 8

SP - 111

EP - 139

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

SN - 0165-4896

IS - 2

ER -