Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games - II

Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of the these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)247-262
Number of pages16
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume10
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1985
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Nash Equilibrium
Game
Folk Theorem
Continuum
Invariant
Nash equilibrium
Extensive games
Continuum of players
Folk theorem

Keywords

  • primitive Nash play
  • replication of an extensive game
  • ε{lunate}-Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games - II. / Dubey, Pradeep; Kaneko, Mamoru.

In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1985, p. 247-262.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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