Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games - II

Pradeep Dubey; Mamoru Kaneko

doi:10.1016/0165-4896(85)90045-9

Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games - II

Pradeep Dubey^*, Mamoru Kaneko

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of the these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	247-262
Number of pages	16
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	10
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(85)90045-9
Publication status	Published - 1985
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

primitive Nash play
replication of an extensive game
ε{lunate}-Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-4896(85)90045-9

Cite this

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AU - Kaneko, Mamoru

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AB - In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of the these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results.

KW - primitive Nash play

KW - replication of an extensive game

KW - ε{lunate}-Nash equilibrium

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JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

IS - 3

ER -

Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games - II

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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