Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games - II

Pradeep Dubey*, Mamoru Kaneko

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of the these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)247-262
Number of pages16
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1985
Externally publishedYes


  • primitive Nash play
  • replication of an extensive game
  • ε{lunate}-Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Economics and Econometrics


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