Integration mechanisms for LQ energy day-ahead market based on demand response

Yusuke Okajima, Toshiyuki Murao, Kenji Hirata, Kenko Uchida

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Demand side management (DSM) has been studied to optimize the demand side of energy networks, which leads to maximization of social welfare. Methods of DSM usually require exchanges of true information used in the optimization process including private information, but in general market participants are not willing to reveal their private information. In a competitive society, each consumer's selfish behavior could generally disturb the maximization of the whole network's benefit. In this paper, we describe a concrete model for consumers, and formulate a dynamic linear quadratic (LQ) energy demand network in which a day-ahead market based on demand response is formed, and apply two kinds of optimization-based mechanisms inspired by mechanism design theory from economics literature. One is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) type mechanism, which is ex post incentive compatible and individually rational. The other is the d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet and Arrow (AGV) type mechanism, which is interim incentive compatible and budget balanced. These mechanisms require the utility company to design an incentive cost (transfer), so that the rational consumption schedules of consumers based on their own benefits lead to the whole network's maximum benefit. Through numerical experiment, we demonstrate effectiveness of the mechanisms.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication2014 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2014
    PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    Pages1-8
    Number of pages8
    ISBN (Print)9781479974092
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014 Dec 9
    Event2014 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2014 - Juan Les Antibes
    Duration: 2014 Oct 82014 Oct 10

    Other

    Other2014 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2014
    CityJuan Les Antibes
    Period14/10/814/10/10

    Fingerprint

    Consumer behavior
    Economics
    Costs
    Industry
    Experiments
    Demand side management

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Science Applications
    • Control and Systems Engineering

    Cite this

    Okajima, Y., Murao, T., Hirata, K., & Uchida, K. (2014). Integration mechanisms for LQ energy day-ahead market based on demand response. In 2014 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2014 (pp. 1-8). [6981320] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCA.2014.6981320

    Integration mechanisms for LQ energy day-ahead market based on demand response. / Okajima, Yusuke; Murao, Toshiyuki; Hirata, Kenji; Uchida, Kenko.

    2014 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2014. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014. p. 1-8 6981320.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Okajima, Y, Murao, T, Hirata, K & Uchida, K 2014, Integration mechanisms for LQ energy day-ahead market based on demand response. in 2014 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2014., 6981320, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1-8, 2014 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2014, Juan Les Antibes, 14/10/8. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCA.2014.6981320
    Okajima Y, Murao T, Hirata K, Uchida K. Integration mechanisms for LQ energy day-ahead market based on demand response. In 2014 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2014. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2014. p. 1-8. 6981320 https://doi.org/10.1109/CCA.2014.6981320
    Okajima, Yusuke ; Murao, Toshiyuki ; Hirata, Kenji ; Uchida, Kenko. / Integration mechanisms for LQ energy day-ahead market based on demand response. 2014 IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2014. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014. pp. 1-8
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