Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relative cost-effectiveness of intergovernmental versus intersource cross-border emissions trading when polluting firms are noncompliant. A special focus is placed on the presence of enforcement costs and the associated credibility problem of governmental monitoring. It is shown that without inspection commitment, the intergovernmental system is more cost-effective because the endorsed flexibility in domestic emission taxation serves as a commitment device for building credibility of monitoring.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)235-261
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume49
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2005 Mar 1

Keywords

  • Emissions trading
  • Intergovernmental versus intersource
  • Noncompliance
  • Time-consistency of monitoring

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

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