International Duopoly with Overseas Production and Strategic Trade Policies

Yasunori Ishii

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper examines the strategic export policies in a reciprocal market model of an international Cournot duopoly where two firms in domestic and foreign countries reciprocally supply their products to other countries through overseas production as well as export. It also considers the fact that the firms must incur export costs in addition to production costs. Thus, this paper shows, among others, that the effects of export policies on firms' output and export choices do not depend on the slopes of firms' reaction curves. It is also shown that firms' total outputs are independent of the export policies, and the optimal domestic and foreign export subsidies are zero (laissez-faire).

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)227-246
    Number of pages20
    JournalJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
    Volume73
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2001

    Fingerprint

    Duopoly
    Strategic trade policy
    Laissez-faire
    Cournot duopoly
    Market model
    Export subsidies
    Production cost
    Costs

    Keywords

    • International Cournot duopoly
    • Overseas production
    • Strategic export policies
    • Two-stage game

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    International Duopoly with Overseas Production and Strategic Trade Policies. / Ishii, Yasunori.

    In: Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, Vol. 73, No. 3, 2001, p. 227-246.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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