Is there an aid-for-participation deal? US economic and military aid policy to coalition forces (non)participants

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6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

There is an empirical evidence of an aid-for-policy deal between the United States and other states; the United States has utilized aid programs to promote affirmative votes in the UN General Assembly and to maintain an alliance relationship with strategically important states. However, whether there is a systematic evidence of an aid-for-participation deal remains inconclusive. Does the United States generally utilize its foreign aid to reward the contribution of troops to the US-led multinational forces and to punish the lack of contribution? The author argues that US foreign aid is used to prevent free-riding in coalition participation. To test the argument, I examined whether states were punished or rewarded by the United States for their behavior in sending or failing to send troops to 15 post-Second World War US-led coalition forces. The results show that the United States punished states for unexpected nonparticipation, but did not always provide rewards for support.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)379-398
Number of pages20
JournalInternational Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Volume8
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Oct 3
Externally publishedYes

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military aid
economic aid
reward
coalition
UN General Assembly
participation
World War
evidence
voter
lack
Participation
Military
Economics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

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abstract = "There is an empirical evidence of an aid-for-policy deal between the United States and other states; the United States has utilized aid programs to promote affirmative votes in the UN General Assembly and to maintain an alliance relationship with strategically important states. However, whether there is a systematic evidence of an aid-for-participation deal remains inconclusive. Does the United States generally utilize its foreign aid to reward the contribution of troops to the US-led multinational forces and to punish the lack of contribution? The author argues that US foreign aid is used to prevent free-riding in coalition participation. To test the argument, I examined whether states were punished or rewarded by the United States for their behavior in sending or failing to send troops to 15 post-Second World War US-led coalition forces. The results show that the United States punished states for unexpected nonparticipation, but did not always provide rewards for support.",
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