Job design, delegation and cooperation: A principal-agent analysis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

53 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes how tasks are assigned in organizations. Tasks can be allocated vertically between a principal and an agent, or laterally among agents. The resulting organizational job design determines how many tasks are delegated to agents, and how the agents' tasks are divided among them. In the framework of the standard principal-agent relationship with moral hazard, it is shown that (i) an incentive consideration causes the principal to group a broad range of tasks into an agent's job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of them specialize in just one task; and (ii) the principal may choose to delegate all the tasks in order to mitigate a conflicting incentive problem with agents.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)691-700
Number of pages10
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume38
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1994
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Delegation
Job design
Incentives
Moral hazard
Multiple agents
Principal-agent relationship

Keywords

  • Delegation
  • Job design
  • Principal-agent relationship
  • Task overlap
  • Team production

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Job design, delegation and cooperation : A principal-agent analysis. / Itoh, Hideshi.

In: European Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 3-4, 1994, p. 691-700.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{eaa20ddfc0534127a348b43b4d705cd5,
title = "Job design, delegation and cooperation: A principal-agent analysis",
abstract = "This paper analyzes how tasks are assigned in organizations. Tasks can be allocated vertically between a principal and an agent, or laterally among agents. The resulting organizational job design determines how many tasks are delegated to agents, and how the agents' tasks are divided among them. In the framework of the standard principal-agent relationship with moral hazard, it is shown that (i) an incentive consideration causes the principal to group a broad range of tasks into an agent's job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of them specialize in just one task; and (ii) the principal may choose to delegate all the tasks in order to mitigate a conflicting incentive problem with agents.",
keywords = "Delegation, Job design, Principal-agent relationship, Task overlap, Team production",
author = "Hideshi Itoh",
year = "1994",
doi = "10.1016/0014-2921(94)90104-X",
language = "English",
volume = "38",
pages = "691--700",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3-4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Job design, delegation and cooperation

T2 - A principal-agent analysis

AU - Itoh, Hideshi

PY - 1994

Y1 - 1994

N2 - This paper analyzes how tasks are assigned in organizations. Tasks can be allocated vertically between a principal and an agent, or laterally among agents. The resulting organizational job design determines how many tasks are delegated to agents, and how the agents' tasks are divided among them. In the framework of the standard principal-agent relationship with moral hazard, it is shown that (i) an incentive consideration causes the principal to group a broad range of tasks into an agent's job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of them specialize in just one task; and (ii) the principal may choose to delegate all the tasks in order to mitigate a conflicting incentive problem with agents.

AB - This paper analyzes how tasks are assigned in organizations. Tasks can be allocated vertically between a principal and an agent, or laterally among agents. The resulting organizational job design determines how many tasks are delegated to agents, and how the agents' tasks are divided among them. In the framework of the standard principal-agent relationship with moral hazard, it is shown that (i) an incentive consideration causes the principal to group a broad range of tasks into an agent's job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of them specialize in just one task; and (ii) the principal may choose to delegate all the tasks in order to mitigate a conflicting incentive problem with agents.

KW - Delegation

KW - Job design

KW - Principal-agent relationship

KW - Task overlap

KW - Team production

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0003019099&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0003019099&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/0014-2921(94)90104-X

DO - 10.1016/0014-2921(94)90104-X

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0003019099

VL - 38

SP - 691

EP - 700

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

IS - 3-4

ER -