Law enforcement with motivated agents

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper provides a law enforcement framework through which to consider principal-agent relations among citizens, an elected official, and a law enforcer. This paper investigates how citizens’ interests are reflected in political competitions in terms of the use of financial incentives, e.g., the allocation of fine revenues, to control the intrinsically motivated law enforcer. This paper points out the limitation of using financial incentives to fully internalize society members’ interest in the enforcer's behavior from a normative perspective. Even if appropriate financial incentives are available, these cannot be chosen under political competitions.

Original languageEnglish
Article number105982
JournalInternational Review of Law and Economics
Volume66
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021 Jun

Keywords

  • Financial incentives
  • Intrinsic motivation
  • Law enforcement
  • Punitiveness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Law

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