Learning games

Nobuyuki Hanaki, Ryuichiro Ishikawa, Eizo Akiyama

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others. However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow learners.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1739-1756
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume33
Issue number10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Oct 1
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Computer simulation
  • Learning
  • Subjective views

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Control and Optimization
  • Applied Mathematics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Learning games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this