Legislative organization in MMP

The case of New Zealand

Kuniaki Nemoto, Robert Pekkanen, Ellis S. Krauss, Nigel S. Roberts

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    How do electoral systems affect legislative organization? The change in electoral systems from Single Member District plurality (SMD) to Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) in New Zealand can illuminate how electoral incentives affect the distribution of cabinet positions. Because in SMD the outcome of individual local districts determines the number of seats a party wins collectively, New Zealand parties deploy cabinet posts in order to shore up the electoral fortunes of individual members. In MMP, the total number of seats a party receives is determined by the votes in the proportional representation (PR) portion for the party, which eliminates the incentives to reward electorally unsafe members with cabinet positions. We show that strong cabinet members, measured through experience as prior terms in the cabinet position, are still likely to be retained.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)503-521
    Number of pages19
    JournalParty Politics
    Volume18
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2012 Jul

    Fingerprint

    New Zealand
    organization
    electoral system
    district
    incentive
    proportional representation
    reward
    voter
    experience

    Keywords

    • electoral system change
    • legislative organization
    • mixed-member electoral system
    • New Zealand

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Nemoto, K., Pekkanen, R., Krauss, E. S., & Roberts, N. S. (2012). Legislative organization in MMP: The case of New Zealand. Party Politics, 18(4), 503-521. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810389634

    Legislative organization in MMP : The case of New Zealand. / Nemoto, Kuniaki; Pekkanen, Robert; Krauss, Ellis S.; Roberts, Nigel S.

    In: Party Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4, 07.2012, p. 503-521.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Nemoto, K, Pekkanen, R, Krauss, ES & Roberts, NS 2012, 'Legislative organization in MMP: The case of New Zealand', Party Politics, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 503-521. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810389634
    Nemoto, Kuniaki ; Pekkanen, Robert ; Krauss, Ellis S. ; Roberts, Nigel S. / Legislative organization in MMP : The case of New Zealand. In: Party Politics. 2012 ; Vol. 18, No. 4. pp. 503-521.
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