Linking Decisions with Standardization

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This article proposes a simple mechanism that can be operated without monetary transfers in situations where a group of agents have to decide over a series of common projects and they are not informed about each other’s valuations. It is shown that efficient public decisions can be made by aggregating the standardized values of the declared individual valuations if the number of agents and the number of decision problems are sufficiently large.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)35-48
    Number of pages14
    JournalStudies in Microeconomics
    Volume3
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jun 1

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    Standardization

    Keywords

    • Efficiency
    • linking mechanism
    • public project
    • risk
    • standardization

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

    Cite this

    Linking Decisions with Standardization. / Veszteg, Robert Ferenc.

    In: Studies in Microeconomics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 01.06.2015, p. 35-48.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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