Lobby interaction and trade policy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The paper introduces interaction between organized lobbies in the protection-for-sale framework. Special interest groups provide unconditional contributions such that the marginal contribution of a lobby is decreasing in the total sum collected by the government. In contrast to the protection-for-sale model, not only the proportion of the population that owns capital in the organized sectors, but also the number of lobbies, matters for trade policy. It is also shown that an increase in the number of lobbies has a nonmonotone effect on each lobby's contribution.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)749-765
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Volume170
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

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Trade policy
Interaction
Lobbies
Marginal contribution
Proportion
Special interest groups
Government

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Lobby interaction and trade policy. / Chesnokova, Tatyana.

In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 170, No. 4, 2014, p. 749-765.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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