Localism and coordination under three different electoral systems

The national district of the Japanese House of Councillors

Kuniaki Nemoto, Matthew S. Shugart

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Democratic representation involves tradeoffs between collective actors - political parties seeking to maximize seats - and individual actors - candidates seeking to use their personal vote-earning attributes (PVEAs) to maximize their own chance of election and reelection. We analyze these tradeoffs across three different electoral systems used at different times for the large-magnitude nationwide tier of Japan's House of Councillors. These electoral systems - closed and open-list proportional systems and the single non-transferable vote - differ in the extent to which they entail candidates seeking individual preference votes and in whether collective vote shares affect overall party performance. We use local resources as a proxy for PVEA and seek to determine the extent to which parties nominate " locals" and how much the presence of such locals affects party performance at the level of Japan's prefectures.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-12
Number of pages12
JournalElectoral Studies
Volume32
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Mar

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electoral system
voter
district
candidacy
Japan
performance
election
resources

Keywords

  • Closed lists
  • Coordination
  • Open lists
  • Personal vote
  • Proportional representation
  • SNTV

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Localism and coordination under three different electoral systems : The national district of the Japanese House of Councillors. / Nemoto, Kuniaki; Shugart, Matthew S.

In: Electoral Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, 03.2013, p. 1-12.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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