Long-term power trade model in electricity market based on game theory

[No Value] Geerli; Ikuo Kurihara; Hiroshi Asano; Kenji Okada; Ryuichi Yokoyama

Long-term power trade model in electricity market based on game theory

[No Value] Geerli, Ikuo Kurihara, Hiroshi Asano, Kenji Okada, Ryuichi Yokoyama

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Electricity power industries around the world are undergoing restructuring. Many challenging issues have arisen under the newly deregulated competitive electric power market. The retail competition in electric power market has been introduced in Japan since March 2000. Although the liberalization is limited in a part of the retail power market having about 30% share of total electricity demand, the liberalized customers is now under competitive circumstance among the Utilities and new entrants. This paper proposes a negotiation model to determine electricity trade contracts between a utility, PPS and eligible customers. In addition, the negotiation price and the investment capacity are decided by negotiation model. The proposed approach has been illustrated with a numerical example to verify its effectiveness.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the IEEE Power Engineering Society Transmission and Distribution Conference
Pages	852-857
Number of pages	6
Volume	2
Edition	ASIA PACIFIC
Publication status	Published - 2002
Event	IEEE/PES Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition 2002 : Asia Pacific - Yokahama Duration: 2002 Oct 6 → 2002 Oct 10

Other

Other	IEEE/PES Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition 2002 : Asia Pacific
City	Yokahama
Period	02/10/6 → 02/10/10

Keywords

Deregulation
Games theory
Investment capacity
Negotiation model
Partial liberalization in retail market
Transaction electricity price

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Engineering(all)
Energy(all)

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Cite this

Geerli, N. V., Kurihara, I., Asano, H., Okada, K., & Yokoyama, R. (2002). Long-term power trade model in electricity market based on game theory. In Proceedings of the IEEE Power Engineering Society Transmission and Distribution Conference (ASIA PACIFIC ed., Vol. 2, pp. 852-857)

Long-term power trade model in electricity market based on game theory. / Geerli, [No Value]; Kurihara, Ikuo; Asano, Hiroshi; Okada, Kenji; Yokoyama, Ryuichi.

Proceedings of the IEEE Power Engineering Society Transmission and Distribution Conference. Vol. 2 ASIA PACIFIC. ed. 2002. p. 852-857.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Geerli, NV, Kurihara, I, Asano, H, Okada, K & Yokoyama, R 2002, Long-term power trade model in electricity market based on game theory. in Proceedings of the IEEE Power Engineering Society Transmission and Distribution Conference. ASIA PACIFIC edn, vol. 2, pp. 852-857, IEEE/PES Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition 2002 : Asia Pacific, Yokahama, 02/10/6.

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AB - Electricity power industries around the world are undergoing restructuring. Many challenging issues have arisen under the newly deregulated competitive electric power market. The retail competition in electric power market has been introduced in Japan since March 2000. Although the liberalization is limited in a part of the retail power market having about 30% share of total electricity demand, the liberalized customers is now under competitive circumstance among the Utilities and new entrants. This paper proposes a negotiation model to determine electricity trade contracts between a utility, PPS and eligible customers. In addition, the negotiation price and the investment capacity are decided by negotiation model. The proposed approach has been illustrated with a numerical example to verify its effectiveness.

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