Main bank relationships and capital structure in Japan

Atsuo Fukuda*, Shin'Ichi Hirota

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

23 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper, we argue that the main bank in Japan acts as a quasi-inside monitor of the firm, delegated by other lenders, and that main bank relationships increase the debt capacity of the firm by reducing the agency cost of debt. On the other hand, firms with high debt ratios will strengthen main bank relationships due to the agency problems associated with high leverage. Thus, the debt ratio and main bank relationships are simultaneously determined and have positive effects on each other. The empirical results we obtain support these hypotheses. J. Japan. Int. Econ. September 1996, 10(3), pp. 250-261. Department of Economics, Kyoto Sangyo University, Kamigamo, Kitaku, Kyoto 603, Japan; and Department of Business Administration and Information, Setsunan University, Ikedanakamachi, Neyagawa, Osaka 572, Japan.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)250-261
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of The Japanese and International Economies
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1996 Sept
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations


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