Abstract
Abstract Examining a state-dependent pricing model in the presence of menu costs and dynamic duopolistic interactions, this paper claims that the assumption regarding market structure is crucial for identifying the menu costs for price changes. Prices in a dynamic duopolistic market can be more rigid than those in more competitive markets, such as a monopolistic-competition market. Therefore, the estimates of menu costs under monopolistic competition are potentially biased upward due to the price rigidity from strategic interactions between dynamic duopolistic firms. By developing and estimating a dynamic discrete-choice model with duopoly to correct for this potential bias, this paper provides empirical evidence that dynamic strategic interactions, as well as menu costs, play an important role in explaining the observed degree of price rigidity in weekly retail prices.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 102-118 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2013 Jan 14 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- Dynamic discrete choice game
- Keywords
- Menu costs
- Retail price
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Industrial relations
- Aerospace Engineering
- Strategy and Management
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Cite this
Menu costs and dynamic duopoly. / Kano, Kazuko.
In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 31, No. 1, 14.01.2013, p. 102-118.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Menu costs and dynamic duopoly
AU - Kano, Kazuko
PY - 2013/1/14
Y1 - 2013/1/14
N2 - Abstract Examining a state-dependent pricing model in the presence of menu costs and dynamic duopolistic interactions, this paper claims that the assumption regarding market structure is crucial for identifying the menu costs for price changes. Prices in a dynamic duopolistic market can be more rigid than those in more competitive markets, such as a monopolistic-competition market. Therefore, the estimates of menu costs under monopolistic competition are potentially biased upward due to the price rigidity from strategic interactions between dynamic duopolistic firms. By developing and estimating a dynamic discrete-choice model with duopoly to correct for this potential bias, this paper provides empirical evidence that dynamic strategic interactions, as well as menu costs, play an important role in explaining the observed degree of price rigidity in weekly retail prices.
AB - Abstract Examining a state-dependent pricing model in the presence of menu costs and dynamic duopolistic interactions, this paper claims that the assumption regarding market structure is crucial for identifying the menu costs for price changes. Prices in a dynamic duopolistic market can be more rigid than those in more competitive markets, such as a monopolistic-competition market. Therefore, the estimates of menu costs under monopolistic competition are potentially biased upward due to the price rigidity from strategic interactions between dynamic duopolistic firms. By developing and estimating a dynamic discrete-choice model with duopoly to correct for this potential bias, this paper provides empirical evidence that dynamic strategic interactions, as well as menu costs, play an important role in explaining the observed degree of price rigidity in weekly retail prices.
KW - Dynamic discrete choice game
KW - Keywords
KW - Menu costs
KW - Retail price
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84872064593&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84872064593&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.11.002
DO - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.11.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84872064593
VL - 31
SP - 102
EP - 118
JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization
JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization
SN - 0167-7187
IS - 1
ER -