Mixed oligopoly and productivity-improving mergers

Yasuhiko Nakamura, Tomohiro Inoue

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper investigates productivity improving merger activities between a public firm and a private firm in mixed oligopoly. We assume that the merged firm has two plants (formerly, firms). We show that both owners of a public firm and a private firm want to merge by coordinating their shareholding ratios in the merged firm, whenever the number of private firms is larger than a critical value, while the public firm does not want to merge without the effect of improving the productivity of the merged firm.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume12
Issue number20
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Sep 11

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Mergers
Productivity
Mixed oligopoly
Public firm
Private firms
Owners
Critical value
Shareholding

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Nakamura, Y., & Inoue, T. (2007). Mixed oligopoly and productivity-improving mergers. Economics Bulletin, 12(20).

Mixed oligopoly and productivity-improving mergers. / Nakamura, Yasuhiko; Inoue, Tomohiro.

In: Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 20, 11.09.2007.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Nakamura, Y & Inoue, T 2007, 'Mixed oligopoly and productivity-improving mergers', Economics Bulletin, vol. 12, no. 20.
Nakamura, Yasuhiko ; Inoue, Tomohiro. / Mixed oligopoly and productivity-improving mergers. In: Economics Bulletin. 2007 ; Vol. 12, No. 20.
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