Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games

Takaaki Abe, Shuige Liu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We introduce a modification of Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990) population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS), called monotonic core allocation path (MCAP) for assignment games, which is a sequence of allocations along an order on the set of players satisfying that (1) each allocation is in the core of the subgame of the corresponding players at that step, and (2) the payoffs for each player are non-decreasing through the sequence. The notion of MCAP preserves the population monotonicity of PMAS while avoids the difficulty that PMAS does not exist in many market games. We show that for every assignment game, there is an order of players along which a MCAP exists. The terminals of MCAP form a refinement of the core. We also show that the terminals of MCAP coincide with the extreme core allocations in two subclasses of assignment games: gloves games and Böhm-Bawerk games. The strong connection of MCAP with extreme core allocations suggests some conflict between the stability of a coalition formation process and the fairness of the resulting outcomes.

Original languageEnglish
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Jan 1

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Core allocation
Assignment game
coalition formation
fairness
Population monotonic allocation schemes
market
Population monotonicity
Fairness
Coalition formation
Market games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games. / Abe, Takaaki; Liu, Shuige.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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