Multi-stage non-cooperative game for pricing and connection admission control inwireless local area networks

Bo Gu, Kyoko Yamori, Sugang Xu, Yoshiaki Tanaka

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper focuses on learning the economic behaviour of the access point (AP) and users in wireless local area networks (WLANs), and using a game theoretic approach to analyze the interactions among them. Recent studies have shown that the AP would adopt a simple, yet optimal, fixed rate pricing strategy when the AP has an unlimited uplink bandwidth to the Internet and the channel capacity of WLAN is unlimited. However, the fixed rate strategy fails to be optimal if a more realistic model with limited capacity is considered. A substitute pricing scheme for access service provisioning is hence proposed. In particular, the AP first estimates the probable utility degradation of existing users consequent upon the admission of an incoming user. Second, the AP decides: (i) whether the incoming user should be accepted; and (ii) the price to be announced in order to try to maximize the overall revenue. The condition, under which the proposed scheme results in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), is investigated.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1986-1996
    Number of pages11
    JournalIEICE Transactions on Communications
    VolumeE96-B
    Issue number7
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2013 Jul

    Fingerprint

    Wireless local area networks (WLAN)
    Access control
    Local area networks
    Channel capacity
    Costs
    Internet
    Bandwidth
    Degradation
    Economics

    Keywords

    • Connection admission control
    • Equilibrium
    • Game theory
    • PBE
    • Pricing

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Software

    Cite this

    Multi-stage non-cooperative game for pricing and connection admission control inwireless local area networks. / Gu, Bo; Yamori, Kyoko; Xu, Sugang; Tanaka, Yoshiaki.

    In: IEICE Transactions on Communications, Vol. E96-B, No. 7, 07.2013, p. 1986-1996.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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