Multibidding game under uncertainty

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3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper considers situations in which a group of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I use the budget-balanced multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein in Am Econ Rev 5:1577-1587, 2002) according to which the game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules that can be applied in a wide range of situations. It is shown that the symmetric equilibria of the multibidding game deliver ex-post efficient outcomes if the number of agents is two, for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty, or is very large.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)311-329
Number of pages19
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume14
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes

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Keywords

  • Bidding
  • Efficiency
  • Public project
  • Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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