Multibidding game under uncertainty

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper considers situations in which a group of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I use the budget-balanced multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein in Am Econ Rev 5:1577-1587, 2002) according to which the game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules that can be applied in a wide range of situations. It is shown that the symmetric equilibria of the multibidding game deliver ex-post efficient outcomes if the number of agents is two, for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty, or is very large.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)311-329
Number of pages19
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume14
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Uncertainty
Simple rules
Private information
Public project

Keywords

  • Bidding
  • Efficiency
  • Public project
  • Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Multibidding game under uncertainty. / Veszteg, Robert Ferenc.

In: Review of Economic Design, Vol. 14, No. 3-4, 2010, p. 311-329.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{5140bd44b222472faf4ff2f3971814f1,
title = "Multibidding game under uncertainty",
abstract = "This paper considers situations in which a group of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I use the budget-balanced multibidding mechanism (P{\'e}rez-Castrillo and Wettstein in Am Econ Rev 5:1577-1587, 2002) according to which the game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules that can be applied in a wide range of situations. It is shown that the symmetric equilibria of the multibidding game deliver ex-post efficient outcomes if the number of agents is two, for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty, or is very large.",
keywords = "Bidding, Efficiency, Public project, Uncertainty",
author = "Veszteg, {Robert Ferenc}",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1007/s10058-009-0096-5",
language = "English",
volume = "14",
pages = "311--329",
journal = "Review of Economic Design",
issn = "1434-4742",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
number = "3-4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Multibidding game under uncertainty

AU - Veszteg, Robert Ferenc

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - This paper considers situations in which a group of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I use the budget-balanced multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein in Am Econ Rev 5:1577-1587, 2002) according to which the game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules that can be applied in a wide range of situations. It is shown that the symmetric equilibria of the multibidding game deliver ex-post efficient outcomes if the number of agents is two, for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty, or is very large.

AB - This paper considers situations in which a group of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I use the budget-balanced multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein in Am Econ Rev 5:1577-1587, 2002) according to which the game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules that can be applied in a wide range of situations. It is shown that the symmetric equilibria of the multibidding game deliver ex-post efficient outcomes if the number of agents is two, for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty, or is very large.

KW - Bidding

KW - Efficiency

KW - Public project

KW - Uncertainty

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77956012793&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77956012793&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10058-009-0096-5

DO - 10.1007/s10058-009-0096-5

M3 - Article

VL - 14

SP - 311

EP - 329

JO - Review of Economic Design

JF - Review of Economic Design

SN - 1434-4742

IS - 3-4

ER -