### Abstract

We consider two models of n-person bargaining problems with the endogenous determination of disagreement points. In the first model, which is a direct extension of Nash's variable threat bargaining model, the disagreement point is determined as an equilibrium threat point. In the second model, the disagreement point is given as a Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. These models are formulated as extensive games, and axiomatizations of solutions are given for both models. It is argued that for games with more than two players, the first bargaining model does not preserve some important properties valid for two-person games, e.g., the uniqueness of equilibrium payoff vector. We also show that when the number of players is large, any equilibrium threat point becomes approximately a Nash equilibrium in the underlying noncooperative game, and vice versa. This result suggests that the difference between the two models becomes less significant when the number of players is large.

Original language | English |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 235-250 |

Number of pages | 16 |

Journal | Japanese Economic Review |

Volume | 47 |

Issue number | 3 |

Publication status | Published - 1996 Sep |

Externally published | Yes |

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### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Economics and Econometrics

### Cite this

*Japanese Economic Review*,

*47*(3), 235-250.

**N-person Nash bargaining with variable threats.** / Kaneko, Mamoru; Mao, Wen.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

*Japanese Economic Review*, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 235-250.

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - N-person Nash bargaining with variable threats

AU - Kaneko, Mamoru

AU - Mao, Wen

PY - 1996/9

Y1 - 1996/9

N2 - We consider two models of n-person bargaining problems with the endogenous determination of disagreement points. In the first model, which is a direct extension of Nash's variable threat bargaining model, the disagreement point is determined as an equilibrium threat point. In the second model, the disagreement point is given as a Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. These models are formulated as extensive games, and axiomatizations of solutions are given for both models. It is argued that for games with more than two players, the first bargaining model does not preserve some important properties valid for two-person games, e.g., the uniqueness of equilibrium payoff vector. We also show that when the number of players is large, any equilibrium threat point becomes approximately a Nash equilibrium in the underlying noncooperative game, and vice versa. This result suggests that the difference between the two models becomes less significant when the number of players is large.

AB - We consider two models of n-person bargaining problems with the endogenous determination of disagreement points. In the first model, which is a direct extension of Nash's variable threat bargaining model, the disagreement point is determined as an equilibrium threat point. In the second model, the disagreement point is given as a Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. These models are formulated as extensive games, and axiomatizations of solutions are given for both models. It is argued that for games with more than two players, the first bargaining model does not preserve some important properties valid for two-person games, e.g., the uniqueness of equilibrium payoff vector. We also show that when the number of players is large, any equilibrium threat point becomes approximately a Nash equilibrium in the underlying noncooperative game, and vice versa. This result suggests that the difference between the two models becomes less significant when the number of players is large.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=8744299461&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=8744299461&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:8744299461

VL - 47

SP - 235

EP - 250

JO - Japanese Economic Review

JF - Japanese Economic Review

SN - 1352-4739

IS - 3

ER -