N-person Nash bargaining with variable threats

Mamoru Kaneko, Wen Mao

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider two models of n-person bargaining problems with the endogenous determination of disagreement points. In the first model, which is a direct extension of Nash's variable threat bargaining model, the disagreement point is determined as an equilibrium threat point. In the second model, the disagreement point is given as a Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. These models are formulated as extensive games, and axiomatizations of solutions are given for both models. It is argued that for games with more than two players, the first bargaining model does not preserve some important properties valid for two-person games, e.g., the uniqueness of equilibrium payoff vector. We also show that when the number of players is large, any equilibrium threat point becomes approximately a Nash equilibrium in the underlying noncooperative game, and vice versa. This result suggests that the difference between the two models becomes less significant when the number of players is large.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)235-250
Number of pages16
JournalJapanese Economic Review
Volume47
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1996 Sep
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Nash bargaining
Threat
Bargaining model
Non-cooperative game
Nash equilibrium
Uniqueness
Extensive games
Bargaining problem
Axiomatization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

N-person Nash bargaining with variable threats. / Kaneko, Mamoru; Mao, Wen.

In: Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, 09.1996, p. 235-250.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kaneko, Mamoru ; Mao, Wen. / N-person Nash bargaining with variable threats. In: Japanese Economic Review. 1996 ; Vol. 47, No. 3. pp. 235-250.
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