TY - JOUR
T1 - Negative surprise in UN Security Council authorization
T2 - Do the UK and French vetoes influence the general public’s support of US military action?
AU - Matsumura, Naoko
AU - Tago, Atsushi
N1 - Funding Information:
The corresponding author is grateful for the financial support provided by the Murata Science Foundation (H29) and the first author is thankful for the financial support provided by the Center for Social Systems Innovation, Kobe University.
Funding Information:
The Online appendix, dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. The corresponding author is grateful for the financial support provided by the Murata Science Foundation (H29) and the first author is thankful for the financial support provided by the Center for Social Systems Innovation, Kobe University.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2019.
PY - 2019/5/1
Y1 - 2019/5/1
N2 - Authorization of the use of force by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is believed to increase levels of public support for military action. While scholars have performed sterling research both in theory and empirics on the power of UNSC authorization, there is still much that we do not understand. In particular, we believe that it is necessary to conduct a further study on ‘failed’ authorization cases. As Terrence Chapman points out in his theoretical framework, the general public can derive valuable information based on which of the permanent members of the Council casts a veto; this in turn affects public attitudes towards the use of force. An expected veto cast by the perpetual nay-sayer would not serve as information for the general public. However, if the veto is cast by an allied state of a proposer of the authorizing resolution, the negative vote functions as an information short-cut signaling that the use of force presents a variety of problems, thus reducing public support for the military action. Using online survey experiments, we find supportive evidence for this argument. Our data also suggest that surprising negative information changes the perceptions of legitimacy, legality, public goods, and US interest in a proposed military action, but is unrelated to the perception of costs, casualties or duration.
AB - Authorization of the use of force by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is believed to increase levels of public support for military action. While scholars have performed sterling research both in theory and empirics on the power of UNSC authorization, there is still much that we do not understand. In particular, we believe that it is necessary to conduct a further study on ‘failed’ authorization cases. As Terrence Chapman points out in his theoretical framework, the general public can derive valuable information based on which of the permanent members of the Council casts a veto; this in turn affects public attitudes towards the use of force. An expected veto cast by the perpetual nay-sayer would not serve as information for the general public. However, if the veto is cast by an allied state of a proposer of the authorizing resolution, the negative vote functions as an information short-cut signaling that the use of force presents a variety of problems, thus reducing public support for the military action. Using online survey experiments, we find supportive evidence for this argument. Our data also suggest that surprising negative information changes the perceptions of legitimacy, legality, public goods, and US interest in a proposed military action, but is unrelated to the perception of costs, casualties or duration.
KW - UN Security Council authorization
KW - failed authorization
KW - public opinion
KW - surprise veto
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U2 - 10.1177/0022343318809786
DO - 10.1177/0022343318809786
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85061912024
SN - 0022-3433
VL - 56
SP - 395
EP - 409
JO - Journal of Peace Research
JF - Journal of Peace Research
IS - 3
ER -