Negotiating Complex Contracts

Mark Klein, Peyman Faratin, Hiroki Sayama, Yaneer Bar-Yam

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

157 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Work to date on computational models of negotiation has focused almost exclusively on defining contracts consisting of one or a few independent issues and tractable contract spaces. Many real-world contracts, by contrast, are much more complex, consisting of multiple inter-dependent issues and intractably large contract spaces. This paper describes a simulated annealing based approach appropriate for negotiating such complex contracts that achieves near optimal social welfares for negotiations with binary issue dependencies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)111-125
Number of pages15
JournalGroup Decision and Negotiation
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003 Mar
Externally publishedYes

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Keywords

  • Interdependent issues
  • Non-linear negotiation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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