Negotiation models for electricity pricing in a partially deregulated electricity market

[No Value] Geerli, Ryuichi Yokoyama, Luonan Chen

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    5 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    A rapid move to a market based electric power industry will significantly alter the structure of electricity pricing and system operation. In this paper, we consider a game of negotiation in the electricity market, involving electric utilities, IPPs and large scale customers. We analyze the two-level game strategies for the negotiation process between utilities, IPPs and customers. These have been previously recognized as a way to come up with a rational decision for competitive markets, in which players intend to maximize their own profits. The derived operation rules based on competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equal incremental cost method for the deregulated power system. The proposed approach was applied to several systems to verify its effectiveness.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the IEEE Power Engineering Society Transmission and Distribution Conference
    Pages2223-2228
    Number of pages6
    Volume4
    Publication statusPublished - 2000
    EventProceedings of the 2000 Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting - Seattle, WA
    Duration: 2000 Jul 162000 Jul 20

    Other

    OtherProceedings of the 2000 Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting
    CitySeattle, WA
    Period00/7/1600/7/20

    Keywords

    • Deregulation
    • Economical load distribution
    • Electricity price
    • Electricity wheeling
    • Game theory
    • Negotiation model

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Engineering(all)
    • Energy(all)

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