Abstract
In open networking environments, resources, services, strategies and actions are voluntarily provided, maintained, chosen and determined by independent, rational and autonomous peers. Basically, Game theory is a basic tool for modeling choices by rational agents in those environments, which, usually assumes players choose strategies which maximize utility of game outcomes given their beliefs about what others players will do. This means that the most challenging question is often how beliefs are formed. Intuitively, beliefs depend not only on what people know to be true, but also on what they want to be true (desire). This paper introduces a model of rational choices that allows for this possibility that peers' beliefs are affected by their interests (desires), and, based on this model, analyzes the impact of psychological belief (optimistic bias and pessimistic bias) on the existing altruism-based cooperative mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. We found that, when there exist free riders, on the contrary to the intuitive thought, pessimistic bias of belief on contribution level can facilitate the P2P systems to converge to the stable equilibrium in easier way than optimistic bias.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings - 32nd IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, ICDCSW 2012 |
Pages | 336-341 |
Number of pages | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Event | 32nd IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, ICDCSW 2012 - Macau Duration: 2012 Jun 18 → 2012 Jun 21 |
Other
Other | 32nd IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, ICDCSW 2012 |
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City | Macau |
Period | 12/6/18 → 12/6/21 |
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Keywords
- Altruism
- autonomous networks
- Belief
- incentive mechanisms
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Control and Systems Engineering
Cite this
On studying relationship between altruism and the psychological phenomenon of self-deception in rational and autonomous networks. / Wang, Yufeng; Vasilakos, Athanasios V.; Jin, Qun; Ma, Jianhua.
Proceedings - 32nd IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, ICDCSW 2012. 2012. p. 336-341 6258177.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - On studying relationship between altruism and the psychological phenomenon of self-deception in rational and autonomous networks
AU - Wang, Yufeng
AU - Vasilakos, Athanasios V.
AU - Jin, Qun
AU - Ma, Jianhua
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - In open networking environments, resources, services, strategies and actions are voluntarily provided, maintained, chosen and determined by independent, rational and autonomous peers. Basically, Game theory is a basic tool for modeling choices by rational agents in those environments, which, usually assumes players choose strategies which maximize utility of game outcomes given their beliefs about what others players will do. This means that the most challenging question is often how beliefs are formed. Intuitively, beliefs depend not only on what people know to be true, but also on what they want to be true (desire). This paper introduces a model of rational choices that allows for this possibility that peers' beliefs are affected by their interests (desires), and, based on this model, analyzes the impact of psychological belief (optimistic bias and pessimistic bias) on the existing altruism-based cooperative mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. We found that, when there exist free riders, on the contrary to the intuitive thought, pessimistic bias of belief on contribution level can facilitate the P2P systems to converge to the stable equilibrium in easier way than optimistic bias.
AB - In open networking environments, resources, services, strategies and actions are voluntarily provided, maintained, chosen and determined by independent, rational and autonomous peers. Basically, Game theory is a basic tool for modeling choices by rational agents in those environments, which, usually assumes players choose strategies which maximize utility of game outcomes given their beliefs about what others players will do. This means that the most challenging question is often how beliefs are formed. Intuitively, beliefs depend not only on what people know to be true, but also on what they want to be true (desire). This paper introduces a model of rational choices that allows for this possibility that peers' beliefs are affected by their interests (desires), and, based on this model, analyzes the impact of psychological belief (optimistic bias and pessimistic bias) on the existing altruism-based cooperative mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. We found that, when there exist free riders, on the contrary to the intuitive thought, pessimistic bias of belief on contribution level can facilitate the P2P systems to converge to the stable equilibrium in easier way than optimistic bias.
KW - Altruism
KW - autonomous networks
KW - Belief
KW - incentive mechanisms
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84866431009&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84866431009&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICDCSW.2012.32
DO - 10.1109/ICDCSW.2012.32
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84866431009
SP - 336
EP - 341
BT - Proceedings - 32nd IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, ICDCSW 2012
ER -