On the nature of the voting paradox as a basis of economic analysis

Yasumi Matsumoto

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Economics has pursued the deduction of rational conclusions based on a standard of maximising behaviour such as profit maximisation. This approach inevitably makes preference rankings over alternatives satisfying some rational consistency. But there is a case which does not lead to rational social preference relations in reality. A typical case of irrational preference relations is represented by the voting paradox, n-way deadlock in general. Since there are actually so many social conflicts caused by the voting paradox, it is important to study how to reach a social conclusion in such cases. In this paper, we will examine how to reach an agreement all individuals can accept in the case of a voting paradox. Different from the traditional approach, we do not force a deduction of rational preference relations but try to find a way to reach a social agreement. Although this approach requires all participants to give up their preferences to some extent, it may be possible to decrease social conflicts peacefully because the dignity of the individuals concerned is respected.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)101-114
    Number of pages14
    JournalGlobal Business and Economics Review
    Volume18
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2016

    Fingerprint

    Voting paradox
    Economic analysis
    Preference relation
    Social conflict
    Deduction
    Dignity
    Ranking
    Social preferences
    Economics
    Deadlock
    Profit maximization

    Keywords

    • Cyclical chain
    • Irrational social choice
    • Simple majority decision rule
    • Three-way deadlock
    • Voting paradox

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Business and International Management
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    On the nature of the voting paradox as a basis of economic analysis. / Matsumoto, Yasumi.

    In: Global Business and Economics Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2016, p. 101-114.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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