One-sided games in a war of attrition

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Abstract

This study develops a war-of-attrition model with the asymmetric feature that one player can be defeated by the other but not vice versa; that is, only one player has an exogenous probability of being forced to capitulate. With complete information, the equilibria are almost identical to the canonical war-of-attrition model. On the other hand, with incomplete information on a player's robustness, a war where both players fight for some duration emerges. Moreover, a player who is never defeated may capitulate in equilibrium, and this player will give in earlier if the other player's fighting costs are greater.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)313-331
Number of pages19
JournalB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Volume15
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jul 1

Keywords

  • Bayesian learning
  • asymmetric robustness
  • attrition
  • war

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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