One-sided games in a war of attrition

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This study develops a war-of-attrition model with the asymmetric feature that one player can be defeated by the other but not vice versa; that is, only one player has an exogenous probability of being forced to capitulate. With complete information, the equilibria are almost identical to the canonical war-of-attrition model. On the other hand, with incomplete information on a player's robustness, a war where both players fight for some duration emerges. Moreover, a player who is never defeated may capitulate in equilibrium, and this player will give in earlier if the other player's fighting costs are greater.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)313-331
    Number of pages19
    JournalB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
    Volume15
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jul 1

    Fingerprint

    War of attrition
    Complete information
    Costs
    Incomplete information
    Robustness

    Keywords

    • asymmetric robustness
    • attrition
    • Bayesian learning
    • war

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

    Cite this

    One-sided games in a war of attrition. / Asako, Yasushi.

    In: B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2, 01.07.2015, p. 313-331.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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