TY - JOUR
T1 - Overcoming coordination failure using a mechanism based on gradualism and endogeneity
AU - Kamijo, Yoshio
AU - Ozono, Hiroki
AU - Shimizu, Kazumi
N1 - Funding Information:
This paper owes much to the thoughtful and helpful comments of Professor David Cooper and two anonymous reviewers of Experimental Economics. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the MEXT KAKENHI Grant Number 25380241.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2015, Economic Science Association.
PY - 2016/3/1
Y1 - 2016/3/1
N2 - We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple-choice coordination game. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult one. The Endogenous Ascending mechanism implies that a gradual increase in the upper bound of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. The Endogenous Descending mechanism requires that when the game’s participants fail to coordinate, the level of the next coordination game be adjusted such that the game becomes simpler. We show that gradualism may not always work, but in such instances, its effect can be reinforced by endogeneity. Our laboratory experiment provides evidence that a mechanism that combines three tools, herein termed the “Gradualism with Endogenous Ascending and Descending (GEAD)” mechanism, works well. We discuss how the GEAD mechanism can be applied to real-life situations that suffer from coordination failure.
AB - We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple-choice coordination game. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult one. The Endogenous Ascending mechanism implies that a gradual increase in the upper bound of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. The Endogenous Descending mechanism requires that when the game’s participants fail to coordinate, the level of the next coordination game be adjusted such that the game becomes simpler. We show that gradualism may not always work, but in such instances, its effect can be reinforced by endogeneity. Our laboratory experiment provides evidence that a mechanism that combines three tools, herein termed the “Gradualism with Endogenous Ascending and Descending (GEAD)” mechanism, works well. We discuss how the GEAD mechanism can be applied to real-life situations that suffer from coordination failure.
KW - Coordination failure
KW - Endogenous ascending
KW - Endogenous descending
KW - Gradualism
KW - Laboratory experiment
KW - Minimum effort coordination game
KW - Target adjustment
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84957432320&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84957432320&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10683-015-9433-4
DO - 10.1007/s10683-015-9433-4
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84957432320
SN - 1386-4157
VL - 19
SP - 202
EP - 217
JO - Experimental Economics
JF - Experimental Economics
IS - 1
ER -