Partially binding platforms: Campaign Promises vis-à-vis cost of betrayal

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyse endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent's policy approach his/her own policy.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)322-353
    Number of pages32
    JournalJapanese Economic Review
    Volume66
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015 Sep 1

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    Costs
    Elections
    Discrepancy
    Political competition

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Partially binding platforms : Campaign Promises vis-à-vis cost of betrayal. / Asako, Yasushi.

    In: Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 66, No. 3, 01.09.2015, p. 322-353.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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