Parties for hire: How particularistic parties influence presidents’ governing strategies

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    12 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    I argue that political parties oriented towards particularistic goods affect coalition government in presidential systems. Particularistic parties hire out their support on some item(s) of the presidential agenda in exchange for locally targeted policies or resources under the control of presidents. They are relatively cheap coalition partners for presidents in policy terms and their representation in the legislature provides presidents with coalitional flexibility. My empirical analysis of cabinets in 10 Latin American countries shows that when particularistic parties hold a larger share of the legislative seats minority presidents are less likely to form majority governments and more likely to change the party composition of their cabinets.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)515-526
    Number of pages12
    JournalParty Politics
    Volume21
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jul 19

    Fingerprint

    president
    coalition
    presidential system
    flexibility
    minority
    resources

    Keywords

    • Empirical research
    • Latin America
    • office goals
    • presidential cabinets
    • theory construction

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Parties for hire : How particularistic parties influence presidents’ governing strategies. / Kellam, Marisa Andrea.

    In: Party Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4, 19.07.2015, p. 515-526.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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