Perfectly secure message transmission against rational timid adversaries

Maiki Fujita, Kenji Yasunaga, Takeshi Koshiba

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party cryptographic protocol by which the sender can securely and reliably transmit messages to the receiver using multiple channels. It is assumed that an adversary corrupts a subset of the channels, and makes eavesdropping and tampering over the corrupted channels. In this work, we consider a game-theoretic security model for SMT. Specifically, we introduce a rational adversary who has the preference for the outcome of the protocol execution. We show that, under some reasonable assumption on the adversary’s preference, even if the adversary corrupts all but one of the channels, it is possible to construct SMT protocols with perfect security against rational adversaries. More specifically, we consider “timid” adversaries who prefer to violate the security requirement of SMT, but do not prefer the tampering actions to be detected. In the traditional cryptographic setting, perfect SMT can be constructed only when the adversary corrupt a minority of the channels. Our results demonstrate a way of circumventing the impossibility results of cryptographic protocols based on a game-theoretic approach.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - 9th International Conference, GameSec 2018, Proceedings
    EditorsLinda Bushnell, Radha Poovendran, Tamer Basar
    PublisherSpringer-Verlag
    Pages127-144
    Number of pages18
    ISBN (Print)9783030015534
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jan 1
    Event9th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2018 - Seattle, United States
    Duration: 2018 Oct 292018 Oct 31

    Publication series

    NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
    Volume11199 LNCS
    ISSN (Print)0302-9743
    ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

    Other

    Other9th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2018
    CountryUnited States
    CitySeattle
    Period18/10/2918/10/31

    Fingerprint

    Cryptographic Protocols
    Game
    Security Model
    Violate
    Receiver
    Subset
    Requirements
    Demonstrate

    Keywords

    • Cryptography
    • Game theory
    • Rational adversary
    • Secure message transmission

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Theoretical Computer Science
    • Computer Science(all)

    Cite this

    Fujita, M., Yasunaga, K., & Koshiba, T. (2018). Perfectly secure message transmission against rational timid adversaries. In L. Bushnell, R. Poovendran, & T. Basar (Eds.), Decision and Game Theory for Security - 9th International Conference, GameSec 2018, Proceedings (pp. 127-144). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11199 LNCS). Springer-Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01554-1_8

    Perfectly secure message transmission against rational timid adversaries. / Fujita, Maiki; Yasunaga, Kenji; Koshiba, Takeshi.

    Decision and Game Theory for Security - 9th International Conference, GameSec 2018, Proceedings. ed. / Linda Bushnell; Radha Poovendran; Tamer Basar. Springer-Verlag, 2018. p. 127-144 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11199 LNCS).

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Fujita, M, Yasunaga, K & Koshiba, T 2018, Perfectly secure message transmission against rational timid adversaries. in L Bushnell, R Poovendran & T Basar (eds), Decision and Game Theory for Security - 9th International Conference, GameSec 2018, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11199 LNCS, Springer-Verlag, pp. 127-144, 9th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2018, Seattle, United States, 18/10/29. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01554-1_8
    Fujita M, Yasunaga K, Koshiba T. Perfectly secure message transmission against rational timid adversaries. In Bushnell L, Poovendran R, Basar T, editors, Decision and Game Theory for Security - 9th International Conference, GameSec 2018, Proceedings. Springer-Verlag. 2018. p. 127-144. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01554-1_8
    Fujita, Maiki ; Yasunaga, Kenji ; Koshiba, Takeshi. / Perfectly secure message transmission against rational timid adversaries. Decision and Game Theory for Security - 9th International Conference, GameSec 2018, Proceedings. editor / Linda Bushnell ; Radha Poovendran ; Tamer Basar. Springer-Verlag, 2018. pp. 127-144 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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